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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper undertakes the limited task of determining what interpretive consequences, if any,
might flow from the removal of federal pay equity provisions from their current location in
the Canadian Human Rights Act and placement of such provisions in their own stand-alone
legislation. Part of the interpretive stance courts currently bring to their consideration of the
federal pay equity provisions reflects the placement of these provisions within federal human
rights legislation.
Courts have held that human rights legislation has a special nature or quasi-constitutional status.
This status results from the fundamental character of the values the legislation expresses and the
goals it seeks to implement. There are three implications of this understanding. First, human
rights legislation, by virtue of this status, is given a liberal and purposive interpretation. Second,
human rights legislation is given an “organic and flexible” interpretation. The legislation is read
in light of evolving social conditions and in terms of the most recent conceptions of human
rights. Third, in circumstances of conflict or inconsistency with other legislation, the provisions
of the human rights legislation prevail, regardless of timing of enactment.
Enactment of stand-alone pay equity legislation is unlikely alone to cause significant change
in the judicial fortunes of pay equity measures. There are a number of reasons for this
conclusion. Pay equity provisions share with other aspects of human rights legislation the
characteristic of implementing protection of fundamental human rights. The consonance of
pay equity measures with the international human rights protections to which Canada has
obligated itself and with the equality provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, attests to this fundamental aspect. Pay equity provisions can also be characterized
as remedial, providing recourse for disadvantaged and historically discriminated-against
individuals. This latter claim is born out by the disproportionate economic disadvantage faced
by Canadian women and their comparatively lower remuneration in the labour market.
Additionally, the primacy applicable to human rights legislation in the face of other contrary
legislation, is not likely to be a necessary condition of effective pay equity law. Thus, this
paper does not find that concerns about losing quasi-constitutional status should figure in
consideration of what legislative form to give a revised pay equity law.
Effective federal pay equity strategy is a critical political and legal issue. The question is a
complex one and attempts to provide legislative remedial action have proven to be a challenge.
Thus, judicial treatment of legislative measures is an important consideration. However, the
real challenge does not lie in ensuring continued appropriate interpretive principles for the
legislation. Rather, the tough task ahead rests in the formulation of more effective content
for federal law and policy—content that results in real progress in addressing the stubborn
problem of gender-based wage inequities.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
There are clear and strong arguments to be made that pay equity legislation, removed from a
human rights legislation context, should nonetheless be granted similar interpretive treatment
—at least to the extent of being given a liberal, purposive and organic interpretation.
Consequently, this paper makes no recommendation against such legislative remodelling.
However, should reform of federal pay equity law encompass such legislative revision, the
following recommendations are made.
• Pay equity legislation should contain textual recognition that pay equity is a fundamental
human right, that the federal legislation is enacted in observance of Canada’s international
human rights obligations, and that pay equity is an important element of a commitment to
substantive sex equality. More specifically, with respect to the last element, the legislation
should contain recognition of the remedial character of pay equity law and its purpose of
alleviating female workers’ economic inequality. This should be done both within the text
of the legislation itself and within a legislative preamble.
• Should the issue of primacy be determined to be a problem for pay equity legislation,
inclusion of a primacy clause within the new legislation should be considered.
• Establishment of any new administrative agency should ensure that the agency possesses
sufficient independence from government. Such an administrative feature makes
designation of pay equity as a fundamental human right more credible.
• Legislative reform should be accompanied by publicity and education programs. Such
programs should communicate strongly and clearly the intimate connection between pay
equity and women’s fundamental right to substantive equality.
INTRODUCTION
Almost all jurisdictions in Canada have some form of pay equity legislation or policy.1 While the
precise formulation of the legislative provisionsin terms of both wording and scope differ,
all have, as their objective, the guarantee of equal pay for women and men for work of equal
value.2 The legislative placement of these provisions, however, varies. Ontario3 and Quebec,4 
for example, employ stand-alone pay equity legislation while the federal government situates
its protections within its human rights legislation.
More specifically, the federal provisions lie within the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA).5
Section 11 of the CHRA sets out a complaints-based model of pay equity that applies to both
                                                                                                                                                                          
1
 The province of Alberta alone remains the exception. Section 6(1) of Alberta’s Human Rights, Citizenship
and Multiculturalism Act provides only: “Where employees of both sexes perform the same or substantially
similar work for an employer in an establishment the employer shall pay the employees at the same rate of
pay.”
2
 I use the term “pay equity” to refer to “initiatives that, first, evaluate jobs performed predominantly by
women against dissimilar jobs performed predominantly by men for the same employer and then, where the
jobs are of comparable value, ensure that a ‘female’ job attracts the same pay as a comparable ‘male’ job”
Nitya Iyer, Working Through The Wage Gap: Report of the Task Force on Pay Equity, February 28, 2002,
# AG02055, at 2).
The term “comparable worth” designates similar initiatives, although “pay equity” emphasizes the desired
end result of such legislation and “comparable worth” the process by which wage discrimination and the
“gender-bias of workplace hierarchy” is addressed [Judy Fudge and Patricia McDermott, “Introduction:
Putting Feminism to Work,” in Just Wages: A Feminist Assessment of Pay Equity, edited by Judy Fudge and
Patricia McDermott, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) at 4-6].
The term “equal pay for equal work” is a different sort of initiative.
It requires a comparison of similar work performed by men and women. Where the work is
similar, equal pay for equal work ensures that it attracts the same pay, regardless of whether
it is performed by a woman or a man.... [T]he focus of the comparison is the similarity of
the work performed (Nitya Iyer, Working Through The Wage Gap: Report of the Task Force
on Pay Equity, February 28, 2002, # AG02055, at 3).
“Employment equity” is a remedial measure aimed at desegregating the work force, changing the employment
pattern of women by encouraging, facilitating or mandating women’s involvement in non-traditional work and
in higher-level positions.
3
 Pay Equity Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P-7. This legislation was first proclaimed into force on January 1, 1988 and
was the first pay equity legislation, in any jurisdiction, to apply to the private sector. Manitoba’s Pay Equity Act
(S.M., 1985-86, c. 21-Cap. P13) was the first pay equity legislation outside the context of existing human rights
legislation.
4
 Loi sur l’équité salariale, R.S.Q. 1995, c. E-12.001 as amended.
5
 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S. 1985, c. H-6.
2the private and the public sector.6 This provision remains unchanged from its initial enactment
in 1977 and has a somewhat troubled history, plagued by protracted and costly litigation.
Nitya Iyer, a former law professor and past member of the British Columbia Human Rights
Tribunal, in a recent report, points to the lack of clear definition of terms used in section 11,
arguing that such lack of clarity leaves “room for very different interpretations of what the
section actually prohibits.”7 She notes, as well, that while the Human Rights Commission has
tried to clarify contested meanings through interpretation guides, the latest of these, Equal
Wage Guidelines, 1986,8 has itself been the subject of extensive litigation.9 In a press release
                                                                                                                                                                          
6
 Section 11 provides:
(1) It is a discriminatory practice for an employer to establish or maintain differences in
wages between male and female employees employed in the same establishment who are
performing work of equal value.
(2) In assessing the value of work performed by employees employed in the same
establishment, the criterion to be applied is the composite of skill, effort and responsibility
required in the performance of the work and the conditions under which the work is
performed.
(3) Separate establishments established or maintained by an employer solely or principally
for the purpose of establishing or maintaining differences in wages between male and
female employees shall be deemed for the purposes of this section to be the same
establishment.
(4) Notwithstanding subsection (1), it is not a discriminatory practice to pay male and
female employees different wages if the difference is based on a factor prescribed by
guidelines, issued by the Canadian Human Rights Commission pursuant to subsection
27(2), to be a reasonable factor that justifies the difference.
(5) For greater certainty, sex does not constitute a reasonable factor justifying a difference in
wages.
(6) An employer shall not reduce wages in order to eliminate a discriminatory practice
described in this section.
(7) For the purpose of this section, “wages” means any form of remuneration payable for
work performed by an individual and includes
(a) salaries, commissions, vacation pay, dismissal wages and bonuses;
(b) reasonable value for board, rent, housing and lodging;
(c) payments in kind;
(d) employer contributions to pension funds or plans, long-term disability plans
and all forms of health insurance plans; and
(e) any other advantage received directly or indirectly from the individual’s
employer.
7
 Iyer, supra note 2, at 56.
8
 Equal Wage Guidelines, 1986, SOR/86-1082.
9
 The Guidelines are binding on any human rights tribunal that deals with equal pay complaints under the
Canadian Human Rights Act and have as their purpose the interpretation of section 11—the pay equity
provisions—of the Act. For some of the case law on these Guidelines, see Canada (Attorney General) v.
Public Service Alliance of Canada, [2000] 1 F.C. 146 (T.D.); Syndicat des employés de production du
Québec et de l’Acadie v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) et al, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 879 [hereinafter
Syndicat]; Bell Canada v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, [1999] 1 F.C. 113
(C.A.); Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Airlines International Ltd., [2002] 1
3dated February 2001, Michelle Falardeau-Ramsay, Chief Commissioner of the Canadian
Human Rights Commission, stated: “Major pay equity cases are at a virtual impasse because
of the current system. We believe it is time the government made the necessary changes to
ensure that pay equity becomes a reality.”10
In response to these and other concerns, the establishment of the Pay Equity Task Force was
announced by the ministers of Justice and Labour in June 2001. The broad mandate of the Task
Force is to conduct a comprehensive review of the current equal pay provisions of the Canadian
Human Rights Act (section 11) as well as the Equal Wages Guidelines, 1986. Among other
things, the Task Force will look at experiences with pay equality in Canadian provincial and
territorial jurisdictions as well as international experiences. The Task Force will also study and
evaluate different models and best practices for implementation of pay equity. Part of the Task
Force’s work will thus be to examine and evaluate existing legislative and administrative
frameworks.11 In doing so, the Task Force will hold consultations with a variety of organizations
and with interested individuals. Recommendations for improving section 11 of the Canadian
Human Rights Act are due by March 31, 2003.
Any time pay equity legislation is discussed, acknowledgment of the continuing economic
inequality of Canadian women seems obligatory. Historically and currently, women earn less
money than men and are significantly segregated in what have become most stereotypically
defined as “women’s jobs.”12 Even when employed full time, the earnings of women in 1997
were only 73 percent of what men earned.13 Certainly, the wage gap between men and women
is not entirely a factor of sex discrimination. Other variables are involved. Nonetheless,
dominant understandings of this wage gap and of the gender segregation of the labour force
give significant causal weight to the cumulative effect of systemic and persistent discrimination
against women.14 Women’s work is undervalued and the labour market suffers from gender-
biased segmentation.
                                                                                                                                                                          
F.C. 158 (T.D.); Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada), [2002] 1 F.C. 342 (T.D.); Bell Canada v.
Canada (Human Rights Commission), [2001] 3 F.C. 481 (F.C.A.); Public Service Alliance of Canada v.
National Capital Commission, [1998] 2 F.C. 128 (T.D.); Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees
Assn., [1998] 3 F.C. 244 (T.D.); Iyer, supra note 2, at 56.
10
 Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2001, “Pay Equity System At An ImpasseTime For Action,”
Ottawa, February 15. <http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/news-comm/2001/NewsComm150201.asp?1=e> (accessed
March 30, 2002).
11
 For a full statement of the mandate, see the Task Force’s Web site: <http://www.payequityreview.gc.ca>.
12
 Fudge and McDermott, supra, note 2. Women’s inequality in the labour market is the function of a number
of things: discriminatory practices in hiring, training, promotion, sexual harassment, occupational segregation,
and wage disparity. Pay equity measures focus on wage disparity (Suzanne Handman and Karen Jensen, (1999)
“Pay Equity in Canada: An Overview,” in 7 Canadian Labour & Employment Law Journal, 65, at 65).
13
 Statistics Canada, Women in Canada 2000: A Guide to Understanding the Changing Roles of Women and
Men in Canada. <http://www.statcan.ca/english/ads/89-503-XPE/hilites.htm> (accessed March 30, 2002).
For earlier data, see Canadian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report, Canadian Human Rights
Commission, 1997, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998), at 21.
14
 Handman and Jensen, supra note 12, at 68-69, citing Canadian Human Rights Commission, ibid., at 21;
Fudge and McDermott, supra note 2, at 4-5; N. Agarwal, “Pay Equity in Canada: Current Developments,”
4The impact on women of sex-based wage disparities is reflected in the rate of female and
child poverty, with its adverse consequences on the health, well-being and future of Canadian
women and their children.15 Pay equity is a strategy to address wage inequities between women
and men, to reduce that portion of the gap due to systemic and historic under-valuation of
women’s work. Thus, reform of the federal pay equity program remains a critical feminist
issue—part of understanding and remedying the expression of gender discrimination in
economic relations.16
This paper takes on one small element of the full range of issues around legislative reform. It
confines itself to the narrow discussion of the implications for possible legislative reform of the
current interpretative status assigned human rights and other fundamental rights legislation by
the courts. That is, part of the interpretive baggage courts bring to their consideration of the
federal pay equity provision reflects the placement of this provision within federal human rights
legislation. If the federal government decides, as may very well be recommended,17 that pay
equity provisions deserve their own legislative framework, is the loss of a human rights
legislative context a problem?
This paper concludes that such legislative revision is unlikely to matter significantly to the
judicial fortunes of pay equity measures for a number of reasons, most significant of which is
the common character pay equity provisions share with other human rights protections.
The discussion that follows takes the following path. Part I provides an account of the
interpretive status accorded human rights legislation, noting its various characteristics and
implications. Part II details the ways in which free-standing pay equity provisions share the
underlying content that catalyzes such judicial treatment of human rights legislation. Part III
provides some preliminary thoughts on legislative content for a stand-alone pay equity law to
solidify the desired judicial understanding of the interpretive stance pay equity measures
warrant.
                                                                                                                                                                          
Labor Law Journal, (1990) 518 at 520-521; N. Weiner and M. Gunderson, Pay Equity: Issues, Options and
Experiences, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1990), at 9. The competing explanation understands this sex-based
wage disparity to be a result of neutral market forces reflecting such things as different skills, education, and
family and employment choice between women and men. For a discussion of this, see Fudge and McDermott,
supra note 2.
15
 Women constitute a disproportionate share of those with low incomes. In 1997, 2.8 million women (19 percent
of the total female population) lived in low-income situations whereas only 16 percent of the male population
lived in a similar income bracket. In the same year, almost half of unattached senior women (49 percent) and
56 percent of families headed by lone-parent mothers had incomes which were below Statistics Canada’s low-
income cut-offs. Statistics Canada, “Women in Canada 2000,” The Daily, (Thursday, September 14, 2000).
16
 Fudge and McDermott, supra note 2, at 5.
17
 For an illustration of such a recommendation in relation to equal pay for work of equal value legislation in
British Columbia, see Iyer, supra note 2 at 102.
PART I: QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS
Human Rights Legislation
The first comprehensive judicial statement on the interpretation of human rights legislation is
found in the 1982 Supreme Court of Canada decision of Insurance Corporation of British
Columbia v. Heerspink.18 The case established that human rights legislation is assigned a
special status. Lamer J., on behalf of three of the six judges in the majority, stated that the
Human Rights Code of British Columbia “is not to be treated as another ordinary law
of general application. It should be recognized for what it is, a fundamental law.”19 This
characterization of human rights legislation was expanded upon by the Supreme Court
in Winnipeg School Division No. 1 v. Craton,20 a case dealing with a conflict between
provisions in the then Manitoba Human Rights Act21 and the Public Schools Act.22 In the
course of holding that the Public Schools Act, although a later enactment, did not overrule
the Manitoba Human Rights Act, McIntyre J., speaking for the Court, stated:
Human rights legislation is of a special nature and declares public policy
regarding matters of general concern. It is not constitutional in nature in the
sense that it may not be altered, amended, or repealed by the Legislature. It is,
however, of such nature that it may not be altered, amended or repealed, nor
may exceptions be created to its provisions, save by clear legislative
pronouncement.23
This special nature—or quasi-constitutional status—of human rights legislation “remain[s]
axiomatic”24 in the Supreme Court’s approach to interpretation of human rights legislation.25
It results from the fundamental character of the values the legislation expresses and the goals
it seeks. Such legislation has been found to be law of fundamental importance, incorporating
certain basic goals of our society. 26 Thus, human rights legislation’s quasi-constitutional nature
flows from the way in which it can be understood as a “blueprint” for a desirable society.
                                                                                                                                                                          
18
 Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145 [hereinafter Heerspink].
19
 Ibid., at 158.
20
 Winnipeg Sch. Div. No. 1 v. Craton [1985] 2 S.C.R. 150 [hereinafter Craton].
21
 S.M. 1974, c. 65, C. H175.
22
 R.S.M. 1970, c. P250 and 1980 (Man.) c. 33.
23
 Craton, supra note 20, at 156. Mr. Justice McIntyre’s comments were obiter dicta, but, when unanimous,
such obiter dicta is worth noting.
24
 Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 571 per L’Heureux-Dubé, in dissent but not on this
point, at 119 [hereinafter Gould].
25
 The Supreme Court, in relation to its designation of the Canadian Bill of Rights as a “quasi-constitutional”
instrument, has described this status as a “half-way house between a purely common law regime and a
constitutional one” (Hogan v. The Queen [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574, at 597).
6The implications of this approach are several.27
1. Human rights legislation by virtue of this status is given a liberal and purposive
interpretation. Protected rights are to be broadly interpreted, and exceptions or
defences to such rights narrowly construed.28
In a recent speech, Mr. Justice Bastarache noted that “the linguistic texture and universal
nature of human rights has accorded judges a significant margin of interpretative autonomy.”29
While this statement relates to larger points about judicial review and autonomy with respect
to constitutional interpretation, it, nonetheless, signals an understanding of human rights law in
general as constituting a special interpretive task.
Indeed, it is well-established that human rights legislation is to receive a wide and liberal
construction advancing the objective underlying such laws. 30 Colleen Sheppard, a university
law professor, notes a “growing willingness” of courts to grant a large and liberal
interpretation to the grounds of discrimination set out in human rights legislation.31 She
argues: “The impact of the Canadian Charter and the recognized quasi-constitutional status
of human rights law have reinforced the importance of according a broad and liberal
interpretation to human rights legislation.”32 Judicial examples of this stance abound. 33
Illustration of some of these follows.
                                                                                                                                                                          
26
 Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84, at 90 [hereinafter Robichaud]. It is worth
mentioning that the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (S.Q. 1975, c. 6), as another piece
of human rights legislation, shares this designation as quasi-constitutional legislation. (See, for example,
2747-3174 Québec Inc. v. Quebec (Régie des permis d’alcool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919, per L’Heureux-Dubé,
paras. 90-95.)
27
 The organizing principles which follow are taken from Ruth Sullivan, Drieger on the Construction of
Statutes (3 ed.) (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994). Sullivan’s statement of the rules of interpretation applicable to
human rights legislation have been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Quebéc (Commission des
droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City); Quebéc (Commission des droits de la
personne et des droits de la jeunesse v. Boisbriand (City), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665, at para. 29 [hereinafter
Boisbriand].
28
 Sullivan, ibid., at 383.
29
 Honourable Mr. Justice Michel Bastarache, “The Interpretation of Human Rights: The Challenge,” [2001]
50 UNB LJ/RD UN-B 3, at 4.
30
 Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation, (Concord: Irwin Law, 1997) at 175; Pierre-André Côte, The
Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, Third Edition, (Toronto: Carswell, 2000), at 500. The Supreme
Court of Canada has stated, in reference to the Canadian Bill of Rights case, R. v. Smith (Edward Dewy)
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, para. 42, that such an interpretation establishes “the duty of the Court not to whittle
down the protections...by a narrow construction of what is a quasi-constitutional document.”
31
 Colleen Sheppard, “Grounds of Discrimination: Towards An Inclusive and Contextual Approach,” 80 The
Canadian Bar Review, 893, (2001) at 895.
32
 Sheppard, ibid., at 895.
33
 Heerspink, supra note 18; Craton, supra note 20, Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley v.
Simpson-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 [hereinafter O’Malley]; Bhinder v. Canadian National Railway
Company, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561[hereinafter Bhinder]; Canadian National Railway Company v. Canada
7In the Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley v. Simpson-Sears Ltd. case,
McIntyre J. stated:
The accepted rules of construction are flexible enough to enable the Court to
recognize in the construction of a human rights code the special nature and
purpose of the enactment..., and give to it an interpretation which will advance
its broad purposes. Legislation of this type is of a special nature, not quite
constitutional but certainly more than the ordinaryand it is for the courts to
seek out its purpose and give it effect.34
In Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), Sopinka J. wrote:
In approaching the interpretation of a human rights statute, certain special
principles must be respected. Human rights legislation is amongst the most
preeminent category of legislation. It has been described as having a “special
nature, not quite constitutional but certainly more than the ordinary….” One
of the reasons such legislation has been so described is that it is often the final
refuge of the disadvantaged and the disenfranchised. As the last protection of
the most vulnerable members of society, exceptions to such legislation should
be narrowly construed.35
In Dickason v. University of Alberta,36 L’Heureux-Dubé J., in dissent, but not on this point,
wrote:
In order to further the goal of achieving as fair and tolerant a society as
possible, this Court has long recognized that human rights legislation should
be interpreted both broadly and purposively. Once in place, laws which seek
to protect individuals from discrimination acquire a quasi-constitutional status,
which gives them preeminence over ordinary legislation.37
                                                                                                                                                                          
(Human Rights Commission) and Action travail des femmes, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 [hereinafter Canadian
National Railway Co.]; Robichaud, supra note 26; Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights
Commission), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 321 [hereinafter Zurich]; Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1
S.C.R. 554 [hereinafter Mossop]; Gould, supra note 24, at 635; Béliveau St-Jacques v. Fédération des
employées et employés de services publics inc., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 345 at 402-403.
34
 O’Malley, ibid., at 547.
35
 Ibid., at 339. L’Heureux-Dubé J., in her dissenting judgment in Mossop, supra note 33, at 62, reiterates this
point: “This long line of cases mandates that courts interpret human rights legislation in a manner consistent
with its overarching goals, recognizing as did my colleague Sopinka J. for the majority in Zurich Insurance...
that such legislation is often ‘the final refuge of the disadvantaged and the disenfranchised’.”
36
 Dickason v. University of Alberta, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103 [hereinafter Dickason]; see also Craton, supra
note 20 at 156; Canadian National Railway Co., supra note 33, at 1136.
37
 Dickason, ibid., at 1154.
8The strong message, thus, is that courts are not to “inspect these statutes with a microscope,
but should...give them a full, large and liberal meaning consistent with their favoured status in
the lexicon of Canadian legislation.”38
Ambiguities and other interpretive doubts are resolved so as to promote the anti-
discriminatory goals of the legislation. In a well-known and oft-cited passage from Canadian
National Railway Co. v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), Dickson C.J. wrote:
Human rights legislation is intended to give rise, amongst other things, to
individual rights of vital importance, rights capable of enforcement, in the final
analysis, in a court of law. I recognize that in the construction of [human
rights] legislation the words of the Act must be given their plain meaning, but
it is equally important that the rights enunciated be given their full recognition
and effect. We should not search for ways and means to minimize those rights
and to enfeeble their proper impact.39
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the authority conferred on human rights tribunals to
order measures designed to prevent “the same or a similar [discriminatory] practice occurring
in the future” could encompass an order obligating C.N. to hire women at a specified rate until
the proportion of female employees in the relevant category attained a certain percentage. The
Court’s generous and liberal interpretation of the legislation, more specifically, its rejection of
“strict grammatical construction” in favour of a more purposive interpretation, facilitated
articulation of this novel order.40
In P.S.A.C. v. Canada (Department of National Defence),41 a case involving the Public Service
Alliance of Canada’s complaint that the Department of National Defence discriminated in wage
payment to its female employees, the Federal Court of Appeal awarded compensation for
discriminatory practices which predated the filing of the complaint. In reaching this decision,
the Court of Appeal stated that the provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act are to be
given a large and liberal interpretation so the Act’s anti-discrimination purpose may be
achieved.
As counterpart to a broad and liberal reading of the rights protected in human rights legislation,
a purposive interpretation also requires that a more constrained approach be taken to any
exceptions or defences to such rights the legislation sets out. In Dickason, Cory J. makes this
                                                                                                                                                                          
38
 Canada (Attorney General) v. Rosin, [1991] 1 F.C. 391, at 401, per Linden J.A., quoted with approval by
Lamer C.J. in University of British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353, at 373 [hereinafter Berg]; Gould,
supra note 24, at para. 122, per L’Heureux-Dubé J., in dissent but not on this point. See also Syndicat, supra
note 9, at 927, per L’Heureux-Dubé J. in dissent: the provisions of human rights legislation should “not
receive a technical or restrictive application.”
39
 Canadian National Railway Co., supra note 33, at 1134.
40
 For the Court’s discussion, see, ibid., at 1133, 1145. See also Robichaud, supra note 26, at 89-90.
41
 P.S.A.C. v. Canada (Department of National Defence), [1996] 3 F.C. 789 (Fed. C.A.).
9point: “Current human rights enactments seek to broaden the impact of individual rights, yet
they strive to provide a balancing mechanism so that the many competing interests of society
can be accommodated.”42 Thus, the Court has stressed that it is particularly important when
interpreting human rights legislation to be sensitive to the balancing among competing values
and interests represented by the defences and exceptions.
Interpretive doubts should be resolved in such a way that the overall purpose
of the legislationthe promotion and protection of rightsis fostered. Thus,
exceptions and defences in human rights legislation are strictly construed.43
In Bhinder, Dickson C.J., in dissent but not on this point, wrote:
The tribunal began by stating that human rights legislation is remedial and
that the policies of the Act are not to be compromised or abridged unless
by the express language of the legislation. The bone fide exception must be
interpreted narrowly so as not to conflict with the remedial aims of the Act.44
On another occasion the Supreme Court stated:
It has been decided by this Court in Ontario Human Rights Commission v.
Borough of Etobicoke, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202, and reaffirmed in Bhinder v.
Canadian National Railway Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561, that bona fide
occupational qualification exceptions in human rights legislation should, in
principle, be interpreted restrictively since they take away rights which
otherwise benefit from a liberal interpretation.45
The case of West End Construction Ltd. v. Ontario (Ministry of Labour) saw the Ontario Court
of Appeal use a similar principle to justify a narrow interpretation of a defence provision under
the Limitations Act of Ontario. The complainant sought compensation under the Ontario Human
Rights Code for discriminatory acts. The issue was whether this was “an action for a sum of
money under a statute” within the meaning of Ontario’s Limitation Act. The phrase was
certainly broad enough to capture such an action, given the ordinary meaning of the words.
However, the Court stated that the defence did not apply. The Court stressed that the Code is
“proactive legislation,” creating unique remedies and a specific enforcement process designed to
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 Dickason, supra note 36, at 1121. See also, Zurich, supra note 33, at 340-341; O’Malley, supra note 33, at
552-553, 554, 555.
43
 Dickason, ibid., at 1121, Bhinder, supra note 33, at 567-569.
44
 Bhinder, ibid., at 567-568. See also, Zurich, supra note 33; O’Malley, supra note 33.
45
 Brossard (Town) v. Quebéc (Commission des droits de la personne), [1988] 2. S.C.R. 279 at 307
[hereinafter Brossard]. See also, Bhinder, ibid., at 567-569; Zurich, ibid., at 339, 358: “As the last protection
of the most vulnerable members of society, exceptions to such legislation should be narrowly construed....
Defences to discrimination under the Code must be narrowly construed so that the larger objects of the Code
are not frustrated” (per Sopinka J. writing for the majority).
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“ensure that the dignity of our citizenry is sustained.”46 The Court also relied on the quasi-
constitutional status of the Code in concluding:
I do not believe that it is possible to force-feed the hybrid proceedings created
by the Code into a limitations statute which finds its origins in 1833 when this
type of affirmative action legislation was in no one’s contemplation.... If there
is to be a limitation period, it must be fashioned to fit the Code.47
Thus, human rights legislation enjoys an expansive interpretation. As instruments with the
central purpose of protection of fundamental human rights, the Supreme Court of Canada has
confirmed in a large number of cases that they are to be given a broad and liberal interpretation.
A note of caution, however, is apposite. The guidelines dictating a broad interpretation of
human rights legislation do not justify reading “the limiting words out of the Act or otherwise
[circumventing] the intention of the legislature.”48
2. Important provisions of human rights legislation are to be read in light of evolving
social conditions and in terms of the most recent conceptions of human rights. Drieger
calls this approach to the general terms and concepts of the legislation “organic and
flexible.”49
Unlike “ordinary” legislation, where the assumption is that the meaning of the legislation is
fixed at enactment and changed only by amendment or repeal, human rights legislation shares
with constitutional legislation a more dynamic or “organic” interpretive process. Ruth Sullivan,
author of a leading text on interpretation, and a law professor, describes such a process.
[M]eaning is not tied to the framer’s original understanding but is permitted
to evolve in response to both linguistic and social change.... [T]he judicial
approach appears to be more flexible and responsive to an evolving external
context than is the case for ordinary legislation.
An organic interpretation involves an interpretation that evolves to reflect changing social
and political thoughts and environments.50
Thus, human rights legislation should be given a dynamic interpretation, as are constitutional
provisions. For example, the Trial Court Judge in Dickason stated that the rights guaranteed
by provincial human rights statutes should be protected to the same degree as comparable
ones guaranteed in the Charter. That is, ensuring protection of the rights in provincial human
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rights legislation requires the guidance of “the criteria formulated by the highest court in the
land to scrutinize actions which violate a comparable protected right under the Charter.”51
In Canada (Attorney-General) v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, Trial Court Justice
John Evans, as he then was, wrote that, because of the quasi-constitutional status of the
Canadian Human Rights Act, it is appropriate to interpret the pay equity provisions in that
Act in ways that reflect changing and subsequent experience.
Parliament was aware that section 11 represented more a statement of
principle than a complete prescription. It is consistent with Parliament’s
intention that the “living tree” of the Act should be nourished by the
experience of other jurisdictions in dealing with the social injustice at which
section 11 is aimed: systemic wage discrimination for work of equal value
resulting from the historical segregation of the labour world by gender, and
the under valuation of women’s work.52
Justice Evans also reproved the federal government for a legal argument, based he said:
…on the narrowest possible interpretation of the Canadian Human Rights
Act.... It paid only lip service to the regular admonitions of the Supreme Court
of Canada that, as quasi-constitutional legislation, human rights statutes are to
be interpreted in a broad and liberal manner.53
The Court, in this case, went on to give a more liberal and expansive interpretation of the Act in
rejecting the federal Attorney General’s position with respect to the definition of the problem at
the centre of the pay equity provisions and measures the Tribunal could lawfully employ to
tackle the problem.
The Supreme Court of Canada, itself, has consistently taken such a flexible and adaptive
approach to its interpretation of human rights legislation. Thus, the Court has expressed
a concern to develop the particular provisions of human rights legislation with an eye to
its general policies and goals. This approach explains the development of adverse effect
discrimination and the duty to accommodate in the Simpsons-Sears case, despite the absence
of a clear textual base for such a development.54 McIntyre J. wrote:
The Code accords the right to be free from discrimination in employment.
While no right can be regarded as absolute, a natural corollary to the
recognition of a rights must be the social acceptance of a general duty to
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respect and to act within reason to protect it.... In this case, consistent with
the provisions and intent of the Ontario Human Rights Code, the employee’s
right requires reasonable steps towards an accommodation by the employer.55
Recognition of a duty to accommodate, despite the absence of textual reference to it, made
sense as a reflection of currently accepted notions of the character of discrimination, its
systemic bases and appropriate measures to address it.56
In Canada v. Mossop,57 L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissenting opinion illustrates a similar interpretive
stance. She argues that legislative intentionsin this case to exclude same-sex relationships
from coverage under the term “family status”are not decisive. Indeed, she argues that the
phrase had evolved to encompass gay and lesbian relationships, despite the obvious contrary
intent of the Act’s framers.
Even if Parliament had in mind a specific idea of the scope of “family
status,”...concepts of equality and liberty which appear in human rights
documents are not bounded by the precise understanding of those who drafted
them. Human rights codes are documents that embody fundamental principles,
but which permit the understanding and application of these principles to
change over time. These codes leave ample scope for interpretation by those
charged with that task.… The enumerated grounds of discrimination must be
examined in the context of contemporary values, and not in a vacuum. As with
other such types of legislation, the meaning of the enumerated grounds in s. 3
of the Act is not “frozen in time” and the scope of each ground may evolve.58
This approach is not without its detractors. Human rights legislation, of course, remains subject
to amendment through the standard legislative process. That is, its quasi-constitutional status
does not confer on it the kind of protection from amendment that entrenchment of constitutional
documents establishes. For that reason—ease of amendment—it has been suggested that the
interpretation of human rights legislation, while liberal and purposive, should not be “organic.”
Marceau J.A., writing at the Federal Court of Appeal level in Canada (Attorney General) v.
Mossop, illustrates such concerns.
[T]he main reason why the Charter had to be interpreted...without the same
deference to the historical intentions of the drafters and legislators, is that
the difficulties of amending the Constitution could cause its provisions to fall
behind changes in society’s conception of basic societal values.... I believe that
if the courts were to adopt, in interpreting human rights acts, a “living tree”
approach towards discerning new grounds of discrimination for proscription,
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or re-defining past meanings foreign to existing grounds, they would step
outside the scope of their constitutional responsibilities and usurp the function
of Parliament.59
3. In circumstances of conflict or inconsistency with other types of legislation, the
provisions of the human rights legislation prevail regardless of timing of enactment.60
Human rights codes in many provinces contain primacy clauses.61 These clauses have been held
effective by the Supreme Court of Canada.62 Such clauses, however, may not be necessary.
The Supreme Court of Canada has also held that, in the case of a conflict between human
rights legislation and other legislation, the human rights legislation is paramount, even in the
absence of a primacy clause, regardless of date of enactment of the other legislation and
whether the other legislation is more specific.63 This is due to an understanding of human
rights legislation as possessing a “special nature,” declaring “public policy regarding matters of
general concern.”64
In Heerspink, Mr. Justice Lamer, speaking for a minority of the Court, stated:
When the subject matter of a law is said to be the comprehensive statement of
the “human rights” of the people living in that jurisdiction, then there is no
doubt in my mind that the people of that jurisdiction have through their
legislature clearly indicated that they consider that law, and the values it
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endeavours to buttress and protect, are, save their constitutional laws, more
important than all others. Therefore, short of that legislature speaking to the
contrary in express and unequivocal language..., it is intended that the [Human
Rights] Code supersede all other laws when conflict arises.65
This passage has subsequently been endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in a number
of other cases. In Craton, for example, Mr. Justice McIntyre, writing for the unanimous
Court wrote:
To adopt and apply any theory of implied repeal by later statutory enactment
to legislation of this kind would be to rob it of its special nature and give
scant protection to the rights it proclaims.66
To conclude, the quasi-constitutional status of human rights legislation, an appellation that
captures the nature of such legislation as protective of fundamental rights, dictates a broad
and liberal, as well as flexible and evolving, interpretation and grants such legislation
presumptive primacy over other legislative enactments.
Other Legislation
Human rights legislation is not alone is its designation as quasi-constitutional. The features
that determine the quasi-constitutional status of human rights legislation are shared by other
types of legislation, to varying degrees. So for instance, municipal development plans have
been granted quasi-constitutional status, due primarily to their foundational role. In Old St.
Boniface Residents Assn. v. Winnipeg (City),67 La Forest J., in dissent but not on this point,
wrote that the Greater Winnipeg development plan, passed by a city by-law, was a quasi-
constitutional instrument and, therefore, was to be interpreted in a liberal and flexible way.
The plan is the instrument by which overall planning for the entire territory of
the city is instituted. It is a general, long-term policy document which serves
as a framework in which specific policies and zoning by-laws are formulated.
It may be viewed as the very foundation of all planning.68
As well, the development plan, because it limited city council powers and had special, more
cumbersome amendment procedures, further shared constitutional features.
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It appears, then, that as a “quasi-constitutional” document, the plan should be
interpreted with an appropriate measure of flexibility, which reflects a balance
between its general, long-term nature, and its statutorily mandated function as
the foundation of the planning process.69
Another characteristic human rights legislation shares with some other legislation is the
protection of fundamental rights. So, for instance, the Supreme Court of Canada has established
that language rights are also a category of fundamental human rights.70 The consequence of such
a designation is that legislation dealing with language rights too has been granted a “purposive
and liberal” interpretive approach.71 The Supreme Court has said that “[l]anguage rights must
in all cases be interpreted purposively....”72
In Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, the Court spelled out more specifically this line
of reasoning.
The importance of language rights is grounded in the essential role that
language plays in human existence, development and dignity. It is through
language that we are able to form concepts; to structure and order the world
around us. Language bridges the gap between isolation and community,
allowing humans to delineate the rights and duties they hold in respect of
one another, and thus to live in society.73
The fundamental character of language rights stems also from the particular constitutional
structure and political history of Canada. In the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada
(Attorney-General) v. Viola (C.A.), Décary J.A. wrote:
The 1988 Official Languages Act is not an ordinary statute. It reflects both
the Constitution of the country and the social and political compromise out of
which it arose. To the extent that it is the exact reflection of the recognition of
the official languages contained in subsections 16(1) and (3) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it follows the rules of interpretation of that
Charter as they have been defined by the Supreme Court of Canada. To the
extent also that it is an extension of the rights and guarantees recognized in
the Charter, and by virtue of its preamble, its purpose as defined in section 2
and its taking precedence over other statutes in accordance with subsection
82(1), it belongs to that privileged category of quasi-constitutional legislation
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which reflects “certain basic goals of our society” and must be so interpreted
“as to advance the broad policy considerations underlying it.” To the extent,
finally, that it is legislation regarding language rights, which have assumed the
position of fundamental rights in Canada but are nonetheless the result of a
delicate social and political compromise, it requires the courts to exercise
caution and to “pause before they decide to act as instruments of change.”74
Similar concerns are echoed in legislation protecting the rights of Aboriginal peoples. Such
legislation too shares constitutional significance and involves issues of fundamental rights.
Thus, it has also been favoured with a liberal interpretation. In a 1983 Supreme Court of
Canada decision, Nowegijick v. R.,75 the Court was asked to consider section 87 of the Indian
Act which stipulated that “the personal property of an Indian...situated on a reserve” was
exempt from taxation. In holding that wages received for off-reserve logging were exempt
under section 87, Dickson J. stated:
It seems to me...that treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally
construed and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians. If the
statute contains language which can reasonably be construed to confer tax
exemption that construction, in my view, is to be favoured over a more
technical construction which might be available to deny exemption.76
This same principle was articulated by Dickson C.J. in Simon v. The Queen77 and has been
affirmed a number of times since.78
Remedial legislation has also been found to deserve a similar broad and liberal interpretation.
While it is difficult to come up with a precise definition of remedial legislation, any legislation
intended to correct a specific legal, social or economic problem can be labelled remedial. More
specifically, the term is most likely to be attached to legislation whose purpose is to protect
vulnerable groups in society. Thus, legislation aimed specifically at inherently vulnerable groups,
such as children, or legislation whose purpose is to deal with situational vulnerability in certain
relationships, such as shareholders or consumers, can fall under this rubric.79 For instance, in
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Genereux v. Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality),80 section
43(8) of Ontario’s Child Welfare Acta provision granting power to hear fresh evidence on
appeal—was to be applied. The Ontario Court of Appeal gave a reading to that provision
contrary to the common law. Cory J.A., as he was then, held:
It can be seen that the judge hearing the appeal is granted a very wide
discretion [to receive new evidence] with no restrictions imposed. This is
remedial legislation dealing with the welfare of children. It should be broadly
interpreted. Undue restrictions should not be placed upon it. Specifically,
narrow restrictions should not be place upon it. Specifically, narrow
restriction should not be read into the section when they do not appear
in the legislation.81
In British Columbia Development Corporation v. Friedman,82 Dickson C.J. understood the
British Columbia Ombudsman Act to be remedial and, therefore, subject to a “large and
liberal” interpretation in keeping with the provincial Interpretation Act.83 In the Toronto Area
Transit Operating Authority v. Dell Holdings Ltd.,84 the Court held that remedial provisions
of the Ontario Expropriations Act were to be given a large and liberal interpretation.85 And,
in R. v. Beaulac,86 Lamer C.J. and Binnie J. wrote, in a concurring judgment, that remedial
provisions, such as the one at stake in the case (the language rights afforded by section 530
of the Criminal Code), are, in the words of the Canadian Interpretation Act,  to “be given
such ‘fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of
[their] objects’.”87
The liberal and purposive interpretation given human rights legislation can also be understood
from this perspective: human rights legislation too has been considered remedial.
[The Canadian Human Rights Act] is not aimed at determining fault or
punishing conduct. It is remedial. Its aim is to identify and eliminate
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discrimination. If this is to be done, then the remedies must be effective,
consistent with the “almost constitutional” nature of the rights protected.88
The remedial character of human rights law reinforces or captures from another perspective
the fundamental and special nature of the protections it affords. This judicial approach was
well summarized by Weiler J.A. in Roberts v. Ontario.89
A human rights code is not like ordinary law. It is a fundamental law which
declares public policy.... Because a human rights code is not an ordinary
statute, rules of statutory interpretation which advocate a strict grammatical
construction of the words are not the proper approach to take in interpreting
its provisions; focusing on the limited words of the section itself would ignore
the dominant purpose of human rights legislation.... A human rights code is
remedial legislation and is to be given such interpretation as will best ensure
its objects are attained.90
Thus, in Robichaud v. the Queen,91 the Supreme Court held that authority to issue orders
“against the person found...to have engaged in the discriminatory practice” was broad enough
to allow orders against an employer in respect of a discriminatory practice engaged in by an
employee while at work. The remedial purposes of the Act justified such a liberal reading of
such powers. La Forest J. wrote:
It is clear to me that the remedial objectives of the Act would be stultified if
the above remedies were not available as against the employer.... Not only
would the remedial objectives of the Act be stultified if a narrower scheme
of liability were fashioned; the educational objectives it embodies would
concomitantly be vitiated.… [T]he interpretation I have proposed makes
education begin in the workplace, in the micro-democracy of the work
environment, rather than in society at large.92
More specifically, the Supreme Court has held that the special character or quasi-constitutional
nature of human rights legislation in part, at least, flows from the fact that such legislation “is
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often the final refuge of the disadvantaged and the disenfranchised...the last protection of the
most vulnerable members of society.”93
Connected to this line of cases are those relatively recent cases that demonstrate the
development of liberal interpretation principles for enactments that recognize the rights of
individuals belonging to disadvantaged groups. Pierre Côté, author of a scholarly book on
legal interpretation,  makes explicit such a connection when he argues that “such directives
are to the welfare state what guidelines favouring protection of individual rights are to classical
liberalism.”94 In support of this statement, Côté  points to a number of Supreme Court of Canada
decisions. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada relied on the principle of liberal interpretation in
relation to the Unemployment Insurance Act95 in Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Attorney General of
Canada.96 La Forest J. wrote that “a law dealing with social security should be interpreted in a
manner consistent with its purpose.”97 A liberal interpretation of the Unemployment Insurance
Act was also employed by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Hills v. Attorney General of Canada.98
In Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance),99 McLachlin J. (as she was then), in a dissenting
judgment, articulated a broad principle of interpretation that “a court, faced with general
language or contending interpretations arising from ambiguity in statutory language, should
adopt an interpretation which best assures adequacy of assistance.”100 In another case, this
one involving interpretation of the Ontario Employment Standards Act, Iacobucci J. argued
that, because it was “benefits-conferring legislation,” the Act should be “interpreted in a
broad and generous manner. Any doubt arising from difficulties of language should be
resolved in favour of the claimant.”101
In Abrahams v. Canada (A.G.),102 a case which involved entitlement to unemployment benefits,
Wilson J. adopted an interpretive approach that favoured the claimant, stating that:
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Since the overall purpose of the Act is to make benefits available to the
unemployed, I would favour a liberal interpretation of the re-entitlement
provisions. I think any doubt arising from the difficulties of the language
should be resolved in favour of the claimant.103
This case thus establishes a liberal reading of both federal and provincial social welfare
legislation.
To summarize this first part of the paper, the quasi-constitutional status of human rights
legislation is reflected in the broad, liberal and purposive interpretation courts are willing to
accord it. Such legislation, however, is not alone in being granted such an interpretation.
Other legislation has been found to also involve fundamental rights and, correspondingly, has
met with similar judicial attitudes. In addition, remedial legislation and legislation protecting
or benefiting disadvantaged or vulnerable groups is also given more liberal and purposive
readings.
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PART II: STAND-ALONE PAY EQUITY LEGISLATION
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the choice between two general structural
avenues for reform of the federal pay equity legislation catalyzes this discussion. Federal
measures can remain within the Canadian Human Rights Act, or these measures can be
situated within their own free-standing legislative scheme. The first option would mean
that pay equity will continue to be seen as part of a regime of human rights legislation. The
second opens the possibility that pay equity measures will be construed differently, perhaps
as labour legislation, as a form of employment right consistent with other employment
legislation whose purpose is protecting vulnerable workers. This latter possibility raises the
question of whether current judicial interpretive approaches to pay equity will change, losing
for pay equity advocates important judicial help in ensuring expansive pay equity measures.
My argument is that this concern about judicial interpretation alone ought not to determine
whether pay equity provisions are retained within the Canadian Human Rights Act. Three
conclusions buttress this argument. First, pay equity measures share enough of the hallmarks
of legislation granted a large and liberal interpretation that a sound case can be made for
continued application of such interpretive principles to them. Second, critical commentary
on judicial interpretation indicates an organic interpretation is applied increasingly by the
judiciary even in cases where the formal markers supporting such an interpretation are not
present. My third conclusion rests on the first two. Given these first two conclusions—that
pay equity legislation would itself warrant a kind of quasi-constitutional status or at least a
liberal and an organic interpretation on its own right and that, in any case, the trend increasingly
seems to be for courts to apply a liberal and purposive interpretation broadly to all statutes—
the only factor attached to human rights legislation that might matter to stand-alone pay equity
legislation is the assumption of primacy. I do not see how this judicially assumed characteristic
will be of significance to pay equity legislation and, in any case, if the conclusion is that it will
matter, a primacy clause can be inserted in the new legislation.
In support of the first of my three contentions—that pay equity measures ought to garner,
on their own, the same kind of interpretation human rights legislation enjoys—it is useful
to return to the first part of this paper’s discussion. Scrutiny of judicial arguments about
interpretation of quasi-constitutional legislation and other forms of legislation, which
receive a large and liberal, and purposive interpretation reveals that the following legislative
characteristics are important: protection of fundamental rights, implementation of central
public policy concerns, remedial nature, conferral of benefits upon, or protection to,
vulnerable, disadvantaged groups. Pay equity measures, even abstracted from their human
rights legislative context, possess all these characteristics. A strong case can therefore be
made that judicial interpretive attitudes toward these provisions ought not to depend on their
legislative housing.
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Pay Equity Legislation as Quasi-Constitutional Legislation
It is worth spending some time discussing this particular characteristic that pay equity shares
with more general human rights legislation as this is, perhaps, the most compelling reason for
arguing that pay equity legislation deserves generous judicial treatment. As the discussion in
Part I illustrates, an important factor in the assignment of special status to human rights laws
is that such laws protect fundamental rights. Hunter writes that the purpose of anti-
discrimination legislation is as follows.
The mischief which the legislature is seeking to remedy...is the affront to
human dignity, the insult or the wounding of the spirit of the individual by
the use of derogatory or offensive exclusions or restrictions or other morally
discreditable acts based on race or religion or...other factors....104
Pay equity, as a variety of human rights, can claim this objective as its own. (After all, it is no
coincidence that legislative protection of pay equity has often been through the mechanism of
inclusion within human rights legislation.)
Three observations are persuasive of this understanding of pay equity measures. First, pay
equity measures are required of the federal and the provincial governments by virtue of
government obligations under international human rights law. Second, pay equity measures
are properly seen as legislative actions dictated by a proactive and substantive approach to
the equality rights enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and by sex
discrimination protections in federal and provincial human rights legislation. And, third, pay
equity provisions share remedial and benefit-conferring characteristics with other non-human
rights legislation that has been accorded a similarly liberal and purposive interpretation.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the legislature intends to observe
the values and policies of international law and constitutional law when it enacts legislation.105
Thus, an interpretation which fulfills or complies with these values is preferred over one that
does not.106 Of course, this interpretive presumption is rebuttable. Parliament or a legislature
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can pass legislation contrary to principles of international law or legislation that, while not
formally contrary to the Charter, fails to advance proactively its values. But courts, in the
absence of strong evidence to the contrary, will assume this is not the intent. Moreover, the
more fundamental or important the value, the clearer contrary legislative intent must be.107
International Obligations
The first observation is the simple reminder that Canadian enactments of pay equity legislation
reflect commitments agreed to in a variety of international human rights instruments. More
specifically, the principle of equal pay without discrimination based on gender is enshrined in
a variety of guises in a number of international documents originating in the United Nations
and the International Labour Organization (ILO), a specialized organization of the United
Nations established in 1946. (Canada is a member of both organizations.) Thus, pay equity
legislation reflects not only domestic constitutional and legislative commitments to sex equality
but also an international consensus about fundamental sex equality. Accordingly, federal (and
provincial) law establishing pay equity protection is understood in light of Canada’s
international obligations to economic sex equality, generally, and to the elimination of
wage discrimination, specifically.108
Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1948, establishes that “[e]veryone, without discrimination, has the right to
equal pay for equal work.”109 Prior to this, the principle of equal pay for equal work had been
included within the Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organization at its
founding in 1919.110 In 1951, this principle of equal pay for equal work was broadened through
the adoption by the member nations of the ILO of Convention (No. 100) Concerning Equal
Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value.111 This Convention
codified the principle of equal pay for work of equal value by requiring all ratifying countries
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during the adoption of the Quebec Charter and that can be usefully referred to for the purposes of interpreting
it” [references in the original text have been omitted] (33 C.H.R.R. D/149 at D/158, para. 56) [hereinafter
Boisbrand (C.A.)].
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to “ensure the application to all workers of the principle of equal remuneration for men
and women workers for work of equal value.”112 Following on its heels in 1958 was
ILO Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation.113 It bound ratifying nations to formulate and apply a national policy for the
promotion of equal treatment in employment and occupation to eliminate discrimination
of the basis of, among other things, sex.114 Canada ratified Convention No. 111 on
November 26, 1964.
                                                                                                                                                                          
procedures for the progressive application of the general principles outlined in the Convention. These are
essentially guidelines for achievement of the principles in the Convention and stipulate, among other things,
that member states should “establish or encourage establishment of methods for objective appraisal of the work
to be performed...with a view to providing a classification of jobs without regard to sex.…” (Equal
Remuneration Recommendation No. 90, 1951, OB 14, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1 Pub. in Official Bulletins).
112
 This Convention was ratified by Canada in 1972. More specifically, the relevant sections of the Convention
read as follows:
Article 1
For the purpose of this Convention
the term remuneration includes the ordinary, basic or minimum wage or salary and
any additional emoluments whatsoever payable directly or indirectly, whether in
cash or in kind, by the employer to the worker and arising out of the worker’s
employment;
the term equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value
refers to rates of remuneration established without discrimination based on sex.
Article 2
1. Each Member shall, by means appropriate to the methods in operation for determining
rates of remuneration, promote and, in so far as is consistent with such methods, ensure the
application to all workers of the principle of equal remuneration for men and women
workers for work of equal value.
2. This principle may be applied by means of
(a) national laws re regulations;
(b) legally established or recognized machinery for wage determination;
(c) collective agreements between employers and workers; or a combination of
these various means.
International Labour Organization Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers
for Work of Equal Value, Art. 2, para. 1, 165, United Nations Treaty Series 303. Adopted at the same time
was the Equal Remuneration Recommendation (No. 90). This Recommendation contains guidelines for the
progressive application of the general principles set forth in Convention No. 100 (1951, OB 14, Vol. XXXIV,
No. 1. Pub. in Official Bulletins).
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(No. 111) (1958, OB, Vol. XLI, No. 2, 79) which, in Article 2, reasserts women’s right to receive the same
remuneration as men for work of equal value.
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Adoption of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)115
in 1966 gave the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value United Nations
recognition. Canada ratified this Covenant in 1976. Article 7 of the CESCR obligates state
parties to take active steps to realize the right to “equal remuneration for work of equal value
without distinction of any kind, in particular [to ensure that] women ...[are] guaranteed
conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work....”116
Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which Canada and Quebec did in 1981,
provides a number of additional international obligations relevant to pay equity. Article 7
of this Convention states a general obligation to eliminate all forms of discrimination against
women. More specific to pay equity concerns is Article 11.1, which provides an obligation
to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment, stipulating the right to
equal remuneration and to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value.117
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T.S. 1976 No. 46.
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 Canada has been criticized by the Committee which monitors the CESCR, the United Nations Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for failure to provide adequate legal protection from wage
discrimination for Canadian women.
The Committee is also concerned about the inadequate legal protection in Canada of
women’s rights which are guaranteed under the Covenant, such as the absence of laws
requiring employers to pay equal remuneration for work of equal value in some provinces
and territories, restricted access to civil legal aid, inadequate protection from gender
discrimination afforded by human rights laws and the inadequate enforcement of those
laws.
The Committee further admonished Canada “to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the realization of
women’s economic, social and cultural rights, including the rights to equal remuneration for work of equal
value.” (Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Canada,
10/12/98: paras. 16 and 53.)
In full, Article 7 states:
The State parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment
of just and favorable conditions of work which ensure, in particular:
Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of
any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to
those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions
of the present Covenant;
Safe and healthy working conditions;
Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an
appropriate higher level. Subject to no considerations other than those of seniority
and competence;
Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays
with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays.
117
 GA Res. 34/189, UN GAOR, 34th Sess., (Supp. No. 46), U.N. Doc. A/34/46, (1982) Can. T.S. 1982 No. 31.
26
The Beijing Declaration and Platform For Action,118 a product of the Fourth World
Conference on Women in Beijing, builds on CEDAW, providing more detailed contemporary
interpretation of what CEDAW requires by way of strategies for gender equality. Twelve
critical areas of concern are identified by the Platform for Action, one of which is “Women
and the Economy.” Strategic objectives for this area include elimination of “all forms of
employment discrimination.”119 More specific actions highlighted as necessary to realize this
objective stipulate that governments, among other actors, are to implement laws that ensure
that international labour standards, such as ILO Convention No. 100 on equal pay and
workers’ rights, apply equally to female and male workers. Governments are also to enact
laws and introduce implementing measures to prohibit discrimination on grounds of sex in
relation to employment, increase efforts to close the gap between women’s and men’s pay,
take steps to implement the principle of equal remuneration for equal work of equal value by
strengthening legislation, establish and strengthen mechanisms to adjudicate matters relating
to wage discrimination and review and, where necessary, reformulate the wage structures in
female-dominated professions to raise their low earnings.120
In 1998, the ILO revisited the basic character of the principles set out in Convention No. 100
and Convention No. 111 in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its annexed Follow-up to the Declaration 121 adopted by the International Labour
Conference. These conventions were designated as two of the eight basic conventions of the
ILO, with a resulting prioritization of the equal pay principle expressed in them.
This backdrop of international conventions and agreements—all of which provide for measures
dealing with pay inequities between women and men—places strong obligations on the Canadian
and provincial governments to implement legislative measures advancing pay equity. It also
provides the Canadian judiciary with compelling interpretive guides to ensure strong and
effective interpretation of such legislative measures.
Constitutional and Legislative Obligations
Reinforcing these specific international commitments to pay equity, are domestic constitutional
and legislative expressions of equality as one of the fundamental values of Canadian society.
Most powerfully, of course, is the Charter’s protection of rights to, among other things, sex
equality. Section 15 of the Charter has been held by the Supreme Court, dating from its first
equality decision, to enshrine a substantive understanding of equality.122 This understanding
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means that section 15 addresses not only direct discrimination but also discrimination’s indirect
and systemic effects.123 Systemic discrimination in the employment context has been described
by the Supreme Court of Canada as “discrimination that results from the simple operation of
established procedures of recruitment, hiring and promotion, none of which is necessarily
designed to promote discrimination.”124 This “most subtle”125 discrimination infects standard
pay practices and job evaluation systems through action of “long-standing social and cultural
mores [that] carry with them value assumptions that contribute to discrimination in ways that
are substantially or entirely hidden and unconscious.”126
While the Charter has not been held to impose positive rights on government,127 pay equity
measures are clearly not only consistent with, but act in furtherance of, the notions of equality
section 15 advances. Pay equity measures have been described by one commentator as “an
example of a remedy to fix ‘adverse effects’ or ‘systemic discrimination’.”128 In Public
Service Alliance of Canada v. Department of National Defence, Mr. Justice Hugessen
of the Federal Court adopted similar observations about pay equity’s purpose in remedying
systemic discrimination.129 As such, pay equity legislation warrants the same kind of
broad, liberal and purposive interpretation human rights legislation receives. Moreover,
a purposive interpretation (one that works to advance the underlying purpose of substantive
sex equality informing pay equity measures) fits well with one of the most basic principles of
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statutory interpretation. The presumption favouring constitutionally valid interpretation in its
broad form means that, when faced with a choice of interpretations, the court will favour an
interpretation that renders the legislation constitutionally valid. A more dilute version of
this presumption results in the infusion of interpretation with constitutional and international
human rights values. This presumption then, reinforces, in the case of pay equity legislation,
the precept that judicial interpretations should reflect the underlying substantive equality
objectives of pay equity law.
Constitutional enshrinement of the values informing pay equity law is certainly one indication
that pay equity reflects core social values and policy. Additionally, however, are the judicial
pronouncements that wage discrimination, more generally understood, constitutes a form of
sex discrimination prohibited by human rights statutes themselves.130 That is, courts have found
that prohibitions against sex discrimination in the employment context can carry similar sorts
of concerns otherwise caught by more specific equal pay provisions within either human rights
legislation or stand-alone legislation. While more focussed and detailed in its proscriptions, pay
equity nonetheless falls under the same rubric of fundamental rights protection assigned to
broader human rights anti-discrimination provisions.
Remedial and Benefits-Conferring Status
An argument about the special interpretive status of pay equity provisions is reinforced by an
understanding that these provisions do impact the protection of vulnerable members of society.
Illustrating this understanding is the decision by a federal human rights tribunal in Public
Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada (Treasury Board) (No. 2)131 where the Tribunal found
that section 11 of the Quebec Charter was remedial legislation dealing with salary inequities
arising between jobs deemed by some process of evaluation to be of equal value.
To conclude, to the extent that there is concern about the loss of the interpretive status
assigned human rights legislation if federal pay equity measures are placed outside human
rights legislation, there are strong arguments in favour of judicial extension of such a status to
whatever legislative form pay equity initiatives should take. Pay equity legislation should be
seen as protective of fundamental human rights—through its reflection of international,
constitutional and domestic equality rights. It must, as well, be seen as important remedial
and benefits-conferring legislation.
Interpretive Practice
My second conclusion—that courts are likely in any case to give the desired liberal and
purposive interpretation to pay equity legislation—flows from a number of judicial and
academic comments. Courts have stated that all statutes, regardless of whether or not they
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are constitutional or quasi-constitutional in nature, are to be interpreted contextually. In
Quebéc (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse), the Supreme
Court noted with approval the following excerpt translated from Côté, Interprétation des
lois.
Without going so far as to say that words have no intrinsic meaning, their
dependence on context for real meaning must be recognized. A dictionary
provides a limited assortment of potential meanings, but only within the
context is the effective meaning revealed....132
Similarly, the Supreme Court, in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re),133 recognized that statutory
interpretation cannot rest on the wording of the legislation alone and adopts the following
statement from Drieger on Construction of Statutes.
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act
are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary
sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the
intention of Parliament.134
As well, federal and provincial interpretation acts typically provide that legislation is to be
considered remedial and read so as to receive a large and liberal construction. The federal
Interpretation Act, for instance, states: “Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be
given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment
of its objects.”135
The Question of Primacy
My third and last conclusion rests on the contention that while legislative primacy may be
important for human rights legislation generally, it is unlikely to be important for stand-alone
pay equity laws. This assumption flows primarily from the more specific focus of pay equity
                                                                                                                                                                          
132
 Pierre-André Côté, Interprétation des lois (Third edition) (Montréal: Thémis, 1999), at 355-356, as quoted
in Quebéc (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City); Quebec
(Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v. Boisbriand (City) [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665, at
para. 31.
133
 Rizzo, supra note 101.
134
 Elmer Driedger, Construction of Statutes (Second edition) (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at 87, as quoted
in Rizzo, ibid., at para. 21. See also, R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, Royal Bank of Canada v.
Sparrow Electric Corp., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411, Verdun v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 550,
Friesen v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 103.
135
 R.S., c. I-23. Section 10 of the Ontario Interpretation Act stipulates that every Act “shall be deemed to be
remedial” and directs that each Act shall “receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation
as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit”
(R.S.O. 1980, c. 219). Section 8 of the British Columbia Interpretation Act states: “Every enactment must be
construed as being remedial, and must be given such fair, large and liberal construction interpretation as best
ensures the attainment of its objects” (RSBC 1996 Chapter 238).
30
provisions, which are unlikely to target or implicate other legislative enactments and thus
unlikely to result in conflict. In any case, should the issue of primacy be determined to be a
problem, it is always possible for the drafters to include a primacy clause within any new
legislation.
PART III: RECOMMENDATIONS
While there are distinct advantages to the sort of interpretation human rights legislation
receives, there are clear and strong arguments to be made that pay equity legislation, removed
from its human rights legislative context, deserves similar treatment.136 Consequently, no
recommendation against such legislative remodelling is forthcoming. However, a number of
cautions are worth extending. In particular, careful thought should be given to the construction
of such legislation, in light of securing for it a liberal and purposive or “organic” interpretation.
If reform of federal pay equity law encompasses the enactment of separate pay equity legislation,
such legislation should contain textual recognition that pay equity is a fundamental human right,
that the federal legislation is enacted in observance of Canada’s international human rights
obligations, and that pay equity is an important element of a central commitment to substantive
sex equality. More particularly, it is remedial legislation enacted to alleviate female workers’
economic inequality. This should be done both in terms of a provision within the text of the
statute itself and with respect to a legislative preamble. In particular, although rare among
contemporary statutes, a preamble can serve important interpretative purposes. Even within
more traditional interpretive doctrines, preambles remain a source of interpretive guidance for
the courts, providing insight into legislative understandings of the mischief the statute seeks to
address. 137
While, the details and character of the administrative structure used to implement pay equity
measures lie obviously well beyond the scope of this paper, some general thoughts on this issue
apply. In its Report to Parliament, Time for Action, the federal Human Rights Commission
emphasizes the importance of an administrative and adjudicative structure that sits at arms
length from government.138 Establishment of any new agency of administrative oversight must
possess this characteristic in order for legislative characterization of pay equity as a fundamental
human right to ring true.139
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Connected to these issues as well is a concern that, regardless of the legislative strategy the
federal government chooses to implement pay equity measures, any legislative reform should
be accompanied by a publicity and education program. While such a program obviously serves
a number of substantive compliance and enforcement goals, it should also communicate
strongly and clearly the intimate connection between pay equity and women’s substantive
equality. Emphasis that pay equity is a fundamental right, a “basic entitlement,” to adopt the
words of Nitya Iyer from the context of a similar recommendation in her report,140 creates a
political and social climate that supports indirectly, and subtly, judicial conclusions in the same
vein.
Conclusion
Effective federal strategy to deal with the persistent sex-based wage disparities suffered by
Canadian women is a critical political and legal issue. The range of political and legal
measures—both internationally and nationally—chosen to accomplish the goal of pay equity
illustrates the complexity of the issue and underlines the fact that effective and politically
rigorous review of current federal law is a challenging task. Clearly, judicial treatment of
whatever legislative measures emerge from this review process is a consideration worthy of
attention. However, if the analysis undertaken by this paper bears true, the real challenge to
reform lies not in retention of existing interpretive status but in formulating a new and more
effective content to federal law that results in real change to the stubborn political problem of
gender-based wage inequities.
                                                                                                                                                                          
140
 Iyer, supra note 2, at 104.
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